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This paper examines whether the European integration process, by transferring policy instruments 
to supra-national authorities, has affected voters’ evaluations of governments’ economic 
performance at elections. The analysis is implemented on a panel of 15 EU countries, from 1970 to 
2011. Results suggest that before the Maastricht Treaty, citizens held incumbents responsible for 
GDP growth and for the evolution of inflation, particularly when measured relative to the EU 
average. After the Maastricht Treaty, there was a significant reduction in the impact of economic 
variables, especially inflation, on electoral outcomes. During the current economic crisis the 
capacity to control the budget deficit appears to be the main determinant of incumbents’ vote 
shares. 
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An important question in political economy is how economic events affect voting behavior. 
Although there is a vast literature on the topic,1 there still is a lively debate on how, and under 
what circumstances, economic performance has a greater effect on electoral results. The present 
paper intends to contribute to this literature by investigating whether and why the European 
integration process has conditioned citizens’ assessments of political responsibility for economic 
outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, this topic has never been investigated.   
Using election and economic data for 13 Western European countries from 1960 to 1997, 
Chappell and Veiga (2000) assessed the relative performance of vote functions motivated by 
alternative economic paradigms, taking into account variations in the extent to which incumbent 
parties are held accountable for economic outcomes. Building on their work, the present paper 
focuses on the institutional changes that occurred in European countries in order to create the 
monetary union. It investigates the economic indicators that have had the most influence on 
election outcomes using an enlarged and updated sample comprising the first 15 countries joining 
the European Union, and covering the period from 1970 to 2011. Did the European integration 
process change the way voters hold the government responsible for the behavior of different 
economic variables? Do voters’ evaluations take into account deviations from the average 
performance of the EU? Is the budget deficit more relevant after the Maastricht Treaty than 
before? Did the current sovereign debt crisis have an impact on voters’ judgments? Does the 
electorate of countries currently receiving international financial assistance behave differently 
from that of the other countries? As far as we know, these questions remain unanswered in the 
literature. Furthermore, the current sovereign debt crisis that several European countries are 
facing, and the inability of European leaders to overcome it, renders the discussion of voters’ fiscal 
conservatism (Peltzman 1992) particularly important. 
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Three explanations for a possible change in voters’ attitudes are discussed, and evaluated 
empirically: (1) the transfer of policy instruments to supranational entities that restricted the 
abilities of national governments to influence their own economies; (2) better knowledge of one 
country’s performance relative to other EU nations; and finally, (3) the possibility open to 
governments for blaming European Institutions for policy choices, particularly concerning 
budgetary options. The analysis is implemented taking into consideration that the dependent 
variable, the proportion of votes obtained by governing parties, is bounded between zero and one. 
Appropriate econometric methods for dealing with the problems introduced by this type of 
variable are discussed and implemented. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents a review of 
the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the sources of data and the empirical model 
specification. Section 4 discusses the empirical results for the baseline models. Section 5 addresses 
the question of whether the Maastricht Treaty changed economic voting. In section 6 we ask if the 
voters in countries that currently receive financial assistance under agreements with the IMF and 
the EU behave differently from the others. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
Although most scholars agree that economics matters for electoral outcomes (Paldam 1991), 
the relative effects are not the same across countries or time (Lewis-Beck 1988), and several 
arguments have been presented to explain such differences. Working on a sample of 17 
democracies from 1948 to 1985, Paldam and Høst (1990) rejected the hypothesis that there is an 
international element in the national vote. Their results indicate that electoral outcomes in 
different countries are not affected by international opinion swings to the right or to the left. 
Powell and Whitten (1993) argued that the partisan nature of the government, its electoral base, 
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and the clarity of its political responsibilities are fundamental to understand the effect of 
economic performance on voting.  According to Pacek and Radcliff (1995), the size and scope of 
the welfare state plays a major role in the relationship between economic conditions and the vote. 
They found that incumbents in countries with large levels of welfare spending are more insulated 
from the business cycle. Chappell and Veiga (2000) contend that voters’ assessments of 
incumbents’ performance depend on what is deemed feasible by voters, as well as to what is 
desirable. Since macroeconomic theories have implications for feasibility constraints, voters’ 
perceptions about the correctness of alternative theories may influence their judgments of 
politicians’ performance.   
Brender and Drazen (2008) tested whether voter behavior is different in new versus old 
democracies and in developed versus less developed countries. Working with a large panel of 
democracies, they concluded that faster growth of GDP per capita are associated with higher 
probabilities of reelection only in the less developed countries and in the new democracies. They 
also found that increases in the government’s budget deficits do not help its reelection chances. 
Moreover, in developed countries with established democracies, deficits are punished at the polls. 
This result is in line with Alesina et al. (2012), who studied the electoral consequences of large 
fiscal adjustments in 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008. Their results indicate that 
governments which quickly reduce the budget deficit are not systematically voted out of office, 
and there is some evidence that fiscally profligate governments tend to lose elections more often 
than average. 
For studies focusing on single countries, there is mixed evidence on the effect of fiscal policy 
on electoral results at the national and sub-national levels. Examples of studies reporting evidence 
that voters are fiscally conservative are Peltzman (1992) for the United States, Brender (2003) for 
Israel, and Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Columbia. However, other papers, such as Akhmedov and 
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Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) for Brazil, Veiga and Veiga (2007) 
and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) for Portugal, and Jones et al. (2012) for Argentina found that 
opportunistic fiscal policies (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990) pay off in subsequent elections. 
The reason to suppose that fiscal consolidations are penalized by voters is that they imply 
future tax increases or spending cuts that, according to Keynesian theory, will generate a 
temporary downturn in the economy. However, in economies where governments are large, and 
especially in countries with persistent deficits and burdensome public debts, citizens may perceive 
fiscal consolidations as necessary, in order to avoid inefficiencies in the public sector and the onset 
of debt crises. If loose fiscal policy is considered harmful, the electorate will punish, rather than 
reward, such budgetary outcomes at the polls. Voters perceive limits to the common-poll resource 
and that, if outlays beyond that are demanded, the associated costs will not be transferred to 
other tax payers, but rather paid by them. 
In the Western European context, there is an additional reason for governments not to be 
punished by restrictive fiscal policies. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which 
established the convergence criteria that countries needed to fulfill in order to join the monetary 
union, and the Stability and Growth Pact, gave governments an excuse for being fiscally 
conservative: the need to comply with supranational agreements that imposed limits on 
budgetary deficits and debt. The main purpose of the current paper is to investigate if the 
European integration process has changed citizens’ assessment of governments’ economic 
performance at the ballot box, and to discuss the reasons that may justify this change in 
evaluation. Instead of estimating the probability of government terminations, as in Brender and 
Drazen (2008) or Alesina et al. (2012), we prefer to estimate vote functions. They are more 
sensitive to changes in popular support for incumbents, since governments can lose votes from 




3. Empirical model specification and data 
Although it is common practice to apply the Ordinary Least Squares method to voting functions, 
the procedure is subject to several criticisms because the dependent variable is bounded between 
0 and 1.2 First, since the proportion of votes is not defined over R it cannot be normally 
distributed. Second, the effect of the explanatory variables is non-linear3 and the variance is a 
function of the mean. To surmount some of these problems, a logistic transformation of the 
dependent variable (V) has been used.4 The regression model takes the following form:  
log(V/1-V) = X’ +                        (1)  
where X represents a vector of explanatory variables,  a vector of parameters to be estimated, 
and  is the error term. This approach avoids the possibility of producing predicted values outside 
the unit interval. However, the use of the logistic transformation is also subject to criticism 
because it assumes that the linear model is related to the response variable via a logit function, 
and that the logit transformation stabilizes the conditional variance.  
Several authors5 argue that a better approach is to implement a beta maximum likelihood 




𝑉𝑝−1(1 − 𝑉)𝑞−1,       (2) 
where B(p,q) denotes the beta function, p>0 and q>0. The mean and variance of v are, 
respectively, 
E(V) = = p/(p+q)         (3) 
and  
var(V) = pq/[(p+q)2(1+p+q)] = (1)/(1+)      (4) 
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Note that the mean is bounded between zero and one but does not include the extremes, and 
that the variance is a function of the mean and a precision parameter ().6 The model is obtained 




         (5) 
Finally, Papke and Wooldridge (2008) proposed the fractional probit model, as an 
alternative estimation procedure for limited dependent variables, which can handle proportions of 
exactly 0 and 1. The fractional probit can be obtained by the pooled Bernoulli quasi-Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation or the Generalized Estimating Equation. The first method assumes that 
unobserved heterogeneity is exogenous, while the second allows for correlated random effects.  
The empirical analysis is performed on a panel covering the first 15 countries joining the 
EU, from 1970 to 2011. We report the estimated results for the logistic transformation of the 
dependent variable, the beta maximum likelihood estimation and the fractional logit.7 As far as we 
know, this is the first paper on voting functions that compares results for three different statistical 
methods recognizing the bounded nature of the dependent variable. 
The dependent variable is the proportion of votes obtained by the parties in government 
before the election, in country i and election t (Vit). Since several governments in the sample are 
coalitions of multiple parties, in alternative specifications we also use as the dependent variable 
the proportion of votes obtained by the main incumbent party. Vectors of political variables (Polit) 
and economic variables (Ecoit) are entered as explanatory variables.  
The vector of political variables takes into account the incumbent’s popular support in the 
previous election (VPEit), whether it is a coalition or not (Coalit), if it is backed by a majority of 
parliamentary deputies or not (Majit), and the number of quarters in power. Three alternative 
measures of tenure were employed: main party in office (Quartersit), prime-minister in office 
(Primeit) and the number of quarters since the last change in the party composition of government 
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(GovChangeit). Governments with broader bases of support are likely to obtain higher percentages 
of votes in the next election. A negative coefficient is expected for the dummy associated with 
coalitions because of conflicts among the government-forming parties. Time in office is likely to 
reduce the incumbent’s popularity, as promises presented before elections are not fulfilled, and 
scandals and decisions that hurt groups of the population accumulate. Paldam (1986) assumes 
that a party’s popularity has a stationary and a temporary component that, on average, is zero. 
Successful parties are more likely to rule, and to lose support in the following election, as their 
popularity returns to its stationary level. According to Paldam and Skott (1995), the cost of ruling 
may reflect a rational demand for change by voters who want to see new faces in office. Another 
explanation for the cost of ruling is based on the idea that poor economic performance has greater 
influence on votes for the incumbent government than good performance (the grievance 
asymmetry theory - Nannestad and Paldam, 1997, 2002). 
The economic performances of countries are captured by unemployment rates (Unempit-
1), changes in annual inflation rates (Change_Infit), and annual real GDP growth rates (GDP_git-1). 
The fiscal regressor is the government’s net lending as a percentage of GDP8 (Surplusit-1). All 
variables, except changes in inflation rates, were lagged one quarter because data are released 
with a lag by statistical bureaus, and may not be immediately perceived by citizens. Changes in 
inflation were not lagged because the contemporaneous variable turned out to be more 
statistically significant in regression analysis. Unemployment, inflation, and slower GDP growth 
rates are expected to decrease votes for the incumbent. As for the budget balance, we have no a 
priori expectations regarding to the sign of the estimated coefficient in the first years of the 
sample: a negative sign would suggest that citizens reward loose fiscal policies (deficits), while a 
positive sign indicates that voters are fiscally conservative. However, for the post-Maastricht 
Treaty period we expect this variable to be positively signed, owing to the fiscal surveillance 
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mechanisms created by European countries in order to achieve the economic and monetary union 
and, later on, to facilitate and maintain its stability.  To test whether voters take into account the 
performance of other EU countries when evaluating their national government, the national 
economic variables were also measured as differences from the EU-15 average.  
Data for the political variables were extracted from the World Bank’s Database of Political 
Institutions – DPI (see Beck et al. 2001). Unemployment rates, inflation rates, real GDP, and 
government net lending as percentage of GDP were obtained from the OECD’s statistics.  All 
variables are quarterly, except for government net lending, which has an annual frequency and 
was linearly interpolated to generate quarterly data. The use of quarterly data allows for a more 
precise test of electoral effects of economic conditions. It avoids the arbitrary decision of 
classifying elections that occurred in the first part of year t as falling in the calendar of year t-1, as 
in Alesina et al. (2012). Information on election dates and the first quarter of data for the main 
economic variables is provided in Appendix Table A-1.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 
1. The government with the lowest vote share in the sample was a single-party government that 
ruled after the 1973 Danish election, with only 12.3% of the votes.9 Most governments in the 
sample are coalitions (63%) and have a majority of deputies in Parliament (75%). The average 
number of quarters since the last change in the party composition of the government is 19.91 
quarters (roughly 5 years), equal to the average time in office of the prime-minister. When time in 
office is measured by the number of quarters the main party stayed in office, the average 
increases to 41.81 quarters (over 10 years). Regarding the economic variables, on average 
government net lending is a negative 2.9% of GDP, with the maximum deficit (-26%) registered in 
Ireland in 2011 and the maximum surplus (6.14% of GDP) occurred in Sweden in 1976. There has 
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been a progressive reduction in inflation during the period considered, and the average annual 





4. Empirical results for the baseline models 
The empirical model was estimated firstly using the logistic transformation of the dependent 
variable and including country fixed effects (LTFE), in order to take into account country 
differences that remain stable over time, namely political institutions.10 Considering the results of 
several authors indicating that the beta maximum likelihood estimation (BMLE) outperforms the 
logistic transformation model, the BMLE was implemented using the cluster option for the 
residuals, which assumes that the observations are independent across countries but not 
necessarily within countries. Finally, the fractional probit estimator (FP), proposed by Papke and 
Wooldridge (2008), was implemented through Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood estimation 
(QMLE).11  
Results for the different methods are reported in the first three columns of Table 2. 
Regardless of the statistical method used, all estimated coefficients show the expected signs. Both 
their statistical significance and their marginal effects12 on the dependent variable are very similar 
across specifications. Regardless of the estimation procedure chosen, there is consistent evidence 
that voters reward GDP growth and positive budget balances,13 and dislike increases in inflation. 
An increase of one percentage point in the GDP growth rate enhances government support 
between 0.36 and 0.45 percentage points, while for the budget balance the effect varies from 0.46 
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to 0.52. An increase of one percentage point in the change in the inflation rate leads to a reduction 




Regarding political variables, governments with broader support bases (percentage of 
votes in the previous election) tend to perform better in the subsequent elections. There is some 
evidence that coalition and majority governments receive larger percentages of votes than single 
party/minority governments. A possible explanation for a coalition government to behave better 
in subsequent elections is a transfer of votes from one member of the coalition to another, 
canceling out the aggregate effect. Three alternative variables were used to measure tenure: main 
party in office (Quartersit), prime-minister in office (Primeit) and the number of quarters since the 
last change in the party composition of the government (GovChangeit). Only the results for the last 
variable are reported in the table, because this is the one that more frequently turned out to be 
statistically significant. There is strong evidence of an erosion of support as time in office 
accumulates, although the effect is relatively small. All other things constant, a one percentage 
drop in GDP causes a loss of governmental support equivalent to 4 quarters in office.15    
Given the similarity of results obtained by the three different methods, in subsequent 
regressions only the results for BMLE are shown. This is also justified by the facts that: (1) the LTFE 
assumes that the residuals follow a normal distribution, but the Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 1% significance level; (2) in our sample, the proportion of votes obtained by the 
incumbent government varies from 0.06 to 0.72, which implies that the BMLE procedure for 
proportions observed inside the open interval (0,1) is appropriate.  
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Since the number of voters varies considerably among the countries included in the 
sample, the model was also estimated by Weighted Least Squares (BMLE-WLS). Previous 
specifications attributed the same weight to all observations, but 49 million citizens voted in the 
German election of 1998, while in Luxemburg’s 1984 balloting, the electorate was only 174,000 
(these are the two extremes in the dataset). Although the voter’s decision to support or not the 
incumbent is discrete, what is observed is the percentage of times this choice is made, which is 
continuous. Following McFadden (1981), this information can be interpreted as if it was produced 
by a representative voter repeatedly making this choice. Therefore, the estimation procedure 
requires special treatment for the aggregate time-series cross-sectional nature of the data. The 
percentage of votes for the parties in government in a large country is an estimator of the 
population mean with lower variance than the percentage of votes for the incumbent parties in a 
smaller country. The variance of the error term (it) is not constant; it decreases with the number 
of voters in country i and election t (Nit).16 Thus, to obtain a vote function of the representative 
voter in Europe, the model was estimated by WLS.  
When using the WLS estimation procedure, there is evidence (column 4) of persistency of 
votes from one election to another and of an erosion of government popularity as time in office 
lengthens. The marginal impact of GDP growth on votes increases considerably when compared 
with the results for the non-weighted regression, while the effects of changes in inflation and of 
government net lending decrease. This suggests that the importance attributed to economic 
variables by voters living in larger countries differs from that of those living in smaller nations.  
The next step was to substitute the national economic variables with their differences 
from EU averages. The results shown in the last two columns of Table 2 reveal that voters dislike 
changes in inflation above the EU average and reward public budget balances above the EU 
average (only in the non-weighted regression). The result for inflation is in line with Chappell and 
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Veiga (2000), who also found European voters to be particularly sensitive to changes in inflation, 
especially when measured relative to the European average 
Because many governments in our sample (63%) are coalitions of parties, and the main 
party in office typically plays a key role in policy decisions, it is likely that voters regard it as more 
responsible for the evolution of the economy. Furthermore, on some occasions there were 
changes between elections in the party composition of coalition governments. To take these facts 
into account, estimates also were computed using the proportion of votes obtained by the main 
party in office as the dependent variable. Because the results are very similar to those presented 
in Table 2, they are not reported in the paper, but they are available from the author upon 
request. 
  
5. The Maastricht Treaty’s impact on economic voting 
This section investigates whether changes in European institutions over time, particularly those 
associated with the Maastricht Treaty, altered the way voters judge incumbent governments. The 
Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 by the members of the European Community in Maastricht, 
Netherlands, and came into force on 1 November 1993. It defined the five convergence criteria 
with which countries had to comply in order to move on to the third phase of European Monetary 
Union (EMU), and adopt the euro in 1999. The conditions that are closer to the economic variables 
used in our empirical analysis are the price stability criterion and the two criteria for public finance 
stability. The inflation criterion established that the country’s inflation rate should be no more 
than 1.5 percentage points higher than the average inflation rate of the three best performing EU 
states. The budgetary criteria set limits on public deficits and debt relative to GDP of, respectively, 
3% and 60%.  
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The main reasons why the Maastricht agreement may have affected the nature of the vote 
function can be summarized as follows: 
(A) The integration process restricted national governments’ policies to European goals and, with 
the creation of the single currency, monetary policy decision making was transferred to the 
European Central Bank. As a consequence, voters may hold governments less accountable for 
economic variables they control less, particularly inflation, with the introduction of the Euro.  
(B) After the treaty’s signing, more information became available for voters regarding the 
economic situation of their country and, particularly, on the performances of EMU candidates. It 
is, therefore, plausible that yardstick comparisons became more salient after the coming into 
effect of the treaty. 
(C) With the agreement, it is likely that voters became more aware of the fiscal variables and 
turned more fiscally conservative, since the adoption of policies to consolidate the budget would 
be regarded as necessary to guarantee the country’s qualification for the third stage of the 
European Monetary Union. The coming into force of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1999 
reinforced the fiscal monitoring of EU members by European Institutions. It is plausible that 
voters’ awareness of the fiscal performance of their countries continued beyond that point. 
To test if the Maastricht Treaty changed the way voters evaluate politicians’ economic 
performance, two dummy variables for the periods before (Before_MTit) and after (After_MTit) the 
Treaty (1994 onwards) were created.17 These two dummies were interacted with each economic 
variable included in the empirical work. According to hypothesis (A), presented above, the impact 
on voting of changes in inflation, and also GDP growth, should be smaller after the 
implementation of the Treaty. Hypothesis (B) suggests that variables measured relative to the 
EU15 average should become more salient after the Maastricht Treaty. Finally, mechanism (C) 
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predicts a change in voters’ reactions to government net lending, with stronger support for larger 
positive balances after the agreement.  
The estimates of the marginal effects of economic variables on the proportion of votes 
cast for the government, using the Beta Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure, are presented 
in Table 3.18 There is evidence of a change in voters’ attitudes owing to the Maastricht Treaty. It is 
clear that before the Treaty citizens rewarded increases in the GDP growth rate, reductions in 
inflation, and downside deviations of this variable from the EU average. After the Treaty, only 
government net lending enters as statistically significant. This goes in favor of hypothesis A: the 
transfer of policy instruments to supranational entities, particularly the European Central Bank 
(ECB), may justify the loss of statistical significance of the variables associated with inflation and 
GDP growth. With monetary policy being conducted by the ECB, national governments have very 
limited power to influence prices. Another aspect worth emphasizing is that, in our sample, 
average inflation before the Maastricht Treaty was 8.4%, while after it was substantially lower 
(2.2%). It is also likely that voters assigned greater importance to changes in inflation before the 
Maastricht Treaty because its level was substantially higher than afterwards.  
Comparisons of the results for variables measured as differences from EU averages, 
columns 4 and 5, reinforce hypothesis A, since deviations of changes in inflation lost their 
statistical significance after the treaty, but do not confirm hypothesis B. Yardstick comparisons 
between countries’ economic performances did not become more salient after the agreement. 
The only exception is the variable measuring the deviations of budget surpluses from the EU 
average.  
In general, after the Treaty, fiscal variables became more important: among the economic 
variables, only the budget surplus and its deviations from the EU average are statistically 
significant. These results support hypothesis C, and reinforce hypothesis A. The idea of voters 
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becoming more fiscally conservative is in line with the results obtained by Brender and Drazen 
(2008) for developed countries with established democracies, and by Alesina et al. (2012) for 
OECD countries. The commitment to fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria by incumbent 
parties and also by the opposition, led to a consensus on fiscal consolidation measures. 
Apparently, the electorate understood the advantages of adopting the euro and the need for fiscal 
consolidation. This is in accordance with Ferejohn (1986), who suggested that governments may 
justify the need to implement unpopular policies with external negative economic conditions or 
constraints outside their control. Therefore, even after the creation of the monetary union, 
national governments could blame European institutions and rules, namely the Stability and 




 The period analyzed (1970-2011) covers the most recent global financial crisis, which led 
to a substantial increase in budget deficits19 and to sovereign debt crises in several EU countries. It 
is likely that the crisis had an impact on voters’ evaluations, increasing their concerns about public 
deficits. In order to test this hypothesis, a dummy variable for the 2008-2011 period was created, 
and interacted with the economic variables. The dummy for the post-Maastricht Treaty was 
redefined to end in 2007. The estimation results are shown in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3. For the 
pre-Maastricht Treaty period, the results are very similar to those of previous specifications: 
voters held incumbents accountable for changes in inflation, particularly when measured relative 
to the EU average, and for GDP growth. There is marginal evidence that they rewarded positive 
net lending. However, for the post-Maastricht Treaty period, it is now clear that the fiscal variable 
becomes relevant only during the 2008-2011 period. These results confirm hypothesis A, rule out 
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hypothesis B, and reduce the support for hypothesis C. More than the Maastricht Treaty, the 
current crisis which created difficulties in securing external funding for several European 
governments and increased the interest rates on sovereign debt, and the fear of the consequences 
of insolvency for several EU members, led citizens to pay special attention to the public finances, 
and to punish incumbents for loose fiscal policy.     
 To test the robustness of the previous conclusions, the sample was split into three sub-
samples: one for the period before the Maastricht Treaty, another one for the period after the 
Treaty, and a third one for the period after the agreement but not including the crisis years (2008-
2011). As can be seen in Table 4, the empirical results are consistent with those reported in the 
previous table. Although the reduction in the number of observations reduces the statistical 
significance of some of the variables, there is evidence that voters held incumbents accountable 
for inflation only before the Maastricht Treaty (hypothesis A); that the agreement did not increase 
yardstick comparisons of the economic performances of the countries (hypothesis B); and finally, 
that after the Treaty voters became more fiscally conservative only during the current economic 




6. Are Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain different? 
This section investigates the hypothesis that the electorates of countries currently benefiting from 
financial assistance programs20 react differently to economic outcomes and fiscal policy. The 
results presented in Table 5 are similar to those of Table 4. Before the Maastricht Treaty, voters 
punished incumbents for increases in inflation and for inflation above the EU average, and they 
rewarded GDP growth and positive budget balances, but not those above the EU average; after 
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the Treaty, they focused their attention on fiscal policy, and showed dislike for deficits. Hypothesis 
A is supported by the results. 
However, two differences deserve to be highlighted. First, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients for the statistically significant variables is substantially larger than in similar 
regressions for the full sample. This is not surprising if we take into account that average inflation 
rates and budget deficits in these countries were almost twice the sample averages (see appendix 
B). Second, in these four countries, voters held incumbents responsible for government net 
lending even before the Maastricht Treaty, favoring politicians who delivered smaller deficits. 
These results may be justified by the fact that the average budget deficit before the Treaty in 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain was 5.38% of GDP, much higher than for the fulloverall 
sample (2.93%). Thus, larger deficits were a more salient economic problem in these four 





The coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, in which European countries established 
their commitment to create a monetary union, changed voters’ evaluations of national 
governments’ economic performances. The need to comply with the convergence criteria to join 
the EMU, and later on the transfer of monetary policy to the European Central Bank, insulated 
governments from the business cycle. While, before the Treaty, changes in inflation, deviations of 
national inflation from the EU-15 average, and GDP growth determined electoral results; after it, 
economic variables lost their statistical significance. It is also possible that voters assign more 
importance to the economic variable that they perceive as being the nation’s main problem. While 
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for the period of 1970 to 1993, average inflation was 8.4%, for the subsequent period it has been 
much lower (2.2%). More recently, the substantial rises in budget deficits and the current 
sovereign debt crisis that several European countries are facing heightened the importance to 
voters of fiscal policymaking. From 2008 to 2011, there is evidence that voters became more 
determinedly fiscally conservative.    
Empirical results for the subsample of countries currently under an international 
assistance program reveal that these countries’ voters reacted more strongly to economic 
variables, and that the budget deficit was a relevant variable in their electoral choices even before 
the Maastricht Treaty. These results reinforce our argument that citizens hold incumbents more 
responsible for the economic variables that they perceive as being problematic and which, 
therefore, may have more salient impacts on their well-being. For these countries, there is also 
evidence of a change in voters’ attitude caused by the European integration process. 
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1 For surveys of economic voting see Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Paldam (2004), Brug et al. (2007), and 
Duch and Stevenson (2008).  
2 Note that the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1 but not censored. According to Maddala 
and Lahiri (2009), it would be inappropriate to apply the censored normal model, or Tobit model, to data 
having those two properties.  
3 Otherwise, with unbounded independent variables the estimated model may predict a proportion of votes 
that lies outside of the [0, 1] boundaries. 
4 See, among others, Dubin and Kalsow (1996), Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010), and Martins and 
Veiga (2011). 
5 See, among others, Paolino (2001), Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004), Kieschnick and McCullough (2003) and 
Smithson and Verkuilen (2006). 
6 For fixed  the larger is the value of  the smaller is the variance of y. 
7 Estimations were obtained using Stata software, version 12.0. The code for the fractional logit was adapted 
from Woldridge and Papke (2008), available at Papke’s web page: http://econ.msu.edu/faculty/papke/ 
index.php. 
8 Although the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance would be more adequate for monitoring the fiscal 
stance of the country, the budget balance is more easily followed by the general public.  
9 In the Danish election of 1973, the vote shares of the four main parties fell by more than 30 percentage 
points and the number of parties represented in parliament doubled, from 5 to 10. After the election, the 
third most voted party (Venstre) formed a small minority government, supported by five other parties. 
10 An F-test rejects the hypothesis of the country dummies being jointly insignificant. The result of a 
Hausman test reveals that the fixed effects model is preferable to the random effects model. The Arellano-
Bond tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation do not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
auto-correlation (p-values of 0.48 and 0.19 respectively). 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
11 The results for the generalized estimating equation are very similar. To facilitate comparison with the 
previous methods, we report the results for the Bernoulli quasi-MLE procedure only. 
12 The marginal effects of each explanatory variable were calculated while holding the other variables at 
their mean values. The marginal effect is the change in the predicted dependent variable for a unit change in 
the explanatory variable, assuming that the effect does not change over that interval.  
13 Changes in the budget surplus were also tested but turned out not to be statistically significant. 
14 Unemployment rates, changes in unemployment and differences from EU averages were also tried in the 
regressions, but rarely turned out as statistically significant. Furthermore, the number of observations on 
the unemployment rate is substantially smaller than those for the other explanatory variables (see appendix 
A), thus reducing the number of degrees of freedom of the estimations.  
15 The ratio of the estimated marginal effects of a one-percentage drop in GDP and time in office is 
(0.01*0.4)/0.001 = 4. 
16 In our model, both the Breusch-Pagan test and a modified Wald statistic for heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
17 For Austria, Finland and Sweden, the dummy for the post-Maastricht period starts assuming the value of 
one only in 1995, when these countries joined the European Union. 
18 The results for the proportion of votes cast for the main party are very similar. They are available from the 
author upon request. 
19 In the sample (see Appendix B), the average for the deficit as percentage of GDP during the period 2008-
2011 was 5.98%, much higher than the average for the overall sample (2.91%). 
20 Financial assistance to Spain currently involves the banking system only. While this paper was being 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable No Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max 
% Votes incumbent gov. (VGit) 173 .4443 .0137 .0685 .7262 
% Votes incumb. gov. previous election (VGPEit) 173 .4825 .0972 .123 .8442 
% Votes main party in gov. (VMPit) 173 .3255 .0986 .0685 .0503 
% Votes main party in gov. lag (VMPit-1) 173 .3528 .1003 .1060 .6200 
Coallition (Coalit) 173 .63 .48 0 1 
Majority of deputies in Parliament (Majit) 173 .75 .44 0 1 
Quarters in office - Main party (Quartersit) 176 41.81 43.63 2 214 
Quarters in office – Prime minister (Primeit) 176 19.91 16.99 1 115 
Quarters since the last change in the party 
composition of the government (GovChangeit) 
176 19.91 14.70 2 76 
National values      
   Government Net Lending (GovNetLendit) 158 -.0291 .0450 -.2607 .0614 
   Change in inflation (Change_infit) 178 -.0051 .0264 -.1218 .0791 
   Annual real GDP growth rate (GDP_git) 179 2.48 .0290 -.0950 .1410 
Difference from EU averages      
   Government Net Lending 158 -.0015 .0379 -.1953 .0842 
   Change in inflation 178 -.0011 .0357 -.0938 .1362 
   Annual real GDP growth rate 178 -.0006 .0193 -.0655 .1019 




Table 2.  Determinants of the percentage of votes for the Government  
 National values 
 
 Differences from EU-15 
averages 
 LTFE BMLE FP-QMLE BMLE-WLS  BMLE BMLE-WLS 
VPEit 2.328*** 2.960*** 1.83*** 3.001***  2.961*** 2.817*** 
 (7.70) (10.91) (11.15) (6.41)  (11.43) (5.81) 
 [.57] [.73] [.71] [.74]  [.73] [.69] 
Majit .020 .083* .042* .112***  .071 .109** 
 (.36) (1.82) (1.68) (2.81)  (1.28) (2.27) 
 [.01] [.02] [.02] [.03]  [.02] [.03] 
Coalit .118** .050 .031 .095  .027 .078 
 (2.20) (.90) (.92) (1.08)  (.45) (.85) 
 [.03] [.01] [.01] [.02]  [.01] [.02] 
GovChangeit -.004** -.003*** -.002*** -.003***  -.003*** -.003*** 
 (-2.62) (-3.20) (-3.18) (-3.10)  (-2.77) (-2.75) 
 [-.001]  [-.001] [-.001] [-.001]  [-.001] [-.001] 
Surplusit-1 1.855** 2.109*** 1.252*** 1.178*  2.236*** .187 
 (2.39) (3.27) (3.04) (1.86)  (2.65) (0.21) 
 [.46] [.52] [.49] [.29]  [.55] [.05] 
Change_infit -2.041*** -1.732*** -1.055*** -.362  -1.457*** -1.578*** 
 (-3.50) (-2.99) (-3.00) (-.62)  (-3.11) (-2.92) 
 [-.50] [-.43] [-.41] [-.09]  [-.36] [-.39] 
GDP_git-1 1.808*** 1.521** .918** 2.514***  1.335 2.350 
 (3.22) (2.14) (2.12) (2.98)  (1.16) (1.62) 
 [.45] [.38] [.36] [.62]  [.33] [.58] 
Observations 154 154 154 154  154 154 
Countries 15 15 15 15  15 15 
Adj. R-squared  .577       
Log pseudolikelihood  202.81 -68.529 208.18  200.42 205.83 
Notes:  Logistic Transformation of the dependent variable and including country Fixed Effects (LTFE). Beta 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (BMLE). Fractional Probit estimator implemented through 
Bernoulli Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation (FP-QMLE). Weighted Least Squares (WLS). 
 * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  
 T-statistics between parentheses and marginal effects between brackets. The marginal effects of 
each explanatory variable were calculated while keeping the other variables at their mean values. 
The marginal effect is the change in the predicted dependent variable for a unit change in the 
explanatory variable, assuming that the effect does not change over that interval.   





Table 3. Before and after the Maastricht Treaty: dummy variables 
 National values  Differences from EU-15 averages 
 BMLE BMLE-WLS BMLE  BMLE BMLE-WLS BMLE 
Before the MT        
 Before_MTit*Surplusit-1 .319* .245 .300*  .289 -.094 .275 
 (1.91) (1.64) (1.75)  (1.34) (-0.39) (1.25) 
 Before_MTit *Change_infit -.258** -.137 -.247**  -.402*** -.419*** -.394*** 
 (-2.40) (-1.07) (-2.20)  (-3.58) (-4.06) (-3.59) 
 Before_MTit *GDP_git-1 .429** .604** .410**  .169 .286 .159 
 (2.28) (2.17) (2.34)  (.40) (0.62) (.38) 
After the MT        
 After_MTit* Surplusit-1 .751*** .487** .286  .893*** .277 .391 
 (4.44) (2.57) (1.26)  (3.49) (.81) (1.18) 
 After_MTit*Change_infit -.362 .691 .894  .251 .130 -.195 
 (-1.06) (1.38) (1.55)  (.40) (.13) (-.30) 
 After_MTit*GDP_git-1 .185 .297 .202  .087 1.03 .475 
 (0.79) (.96) (.80)  (.17) (1.54) (.74) 
Crisis 2008-2011        
 Crisisit* Surplusit-1   .889***    1.201*** 
   (4.69)    (5.20) 
 Crisisit*Change_infit   -.566    1.652 
   (-1.01)    (1.20) 
 Crisisit*GDP_git-1   .088    -.517 
   (.21)    (-.92) 
        
Observations 154 154 154  154 154 154 
Countries 15 15 15  15 15 15 
Notes:  Beta Maximum Likelihood Estimation (BMLE). Weighted Least Squares (WLS). 
 Marginal effects. T-statistics are between parentheses. 
 * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  
  The explanatory variables used in all specifications are the same as those reported in Table 2. For 
parsimony, only the marginal effects associated with the interactions between the dummies for 






Table 4. Before and after the Maastricht Treaty: splitting the sample 
 National values  Differences from EU-15 averages 
 BMLE BMLE-WLS  BMLE BMLE-WLS 
 Before the MT sample 
Surplusit-1 .360* .206  .285 -.116 
 (1.86) (.85)  (1.33) (-.44) 
Change_infit -.224** -.036  -.336*** -.249* 
 (-2.20) (-.24)  (-2.87) (-1.95) 
GDP_git-1 .239 .359  .111 .238 
 (.76) (.91)  (.24) (0.47) 
N. observations 82 82  82 82 
 After the MT sample 
Surplusit-1 .642*** .502***  .865*** .479* 
 (3.24) (2.87)  (3.42) (1.68) 
Change_infit -.586 .013  .162 .228 
 (-1.47) (.02)  (0.23) (.23) 
GDP_git-1 .424 .401*  .199 .632 
 (1.50) (1.97)  (0.40) (.92) 
N. observations 72 72  72 72 
 After the MT without the 2008-11 crisis 
Surplusit-1 -.011 -.113  .147 -.353 
 (-.04) (-.31)  (.42) (-1.10) 
Change_infit .780 1.149  -.139 -.112 
 (1.01) (1.06)  (-.23) (-.15) 
GDP_git-1 .629 .829**  .628 1.711* 
 (1.33) (2.10)  (.95) (1.67) 
N. observations 56 56  56 56 
      
Notes:  Beta Maximum Likelihood Estimation (BMLE). Weighted Least Squares (WLS). 
 Marginal effects. T-statistics are between parentheses. 
 * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  
  The explanatory variables used in all specifications are the same as those reported in Table 2. For 






Table 5. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
 National values  Differences from EU-15 averages 
 BMLE BMLE-WLS BMLE  BMLE BMLE-WLS BMLE 
Before the MT        
  Before_MTit*Surplusit-1 2.102** 2.65*** 2.034***  -1.512 -1.105 -2.171*** 
 (2.48) (2.88) (3.13)  (-1.49) (-.59) (-3.54) 
  Before_MTit *Change_infit -1.362*** -2.07* -1.424***  -.588*** -.789 -.508*** 
 (-3.49) (-1.90) (-7.23)  (-4.69) (-1.14) (-12.42) 
  Before_MTit *GDP_git-1 1.086*** .228 1.021***  -.173 -2.473 -.079 
 (3.97) (0.15) (3.89)  (-.11) (-0.56) (-.06) 
After the MT        
  After_MTit* Surplusit-1 .870*** 1.259* .751***  .877** .908 -.844*** 
 (3.26) (1.94) (2.76)  (2.51) (0.93) (-4.57) 
  After_MTit*Change_infit -.11 1.168 -1.699  1.288 1.778 .531 
 (-.15) (0.65) (-.56)  (1.14) (.89) (.75) 
  After_MTit*GDP_git-1 .152 -.122 .001  -0.004 .059 .318 
 (.28) (-.12) (0.00)  (-0.01) (0.03) (.70) 
Crisis 2008-2011        
 Crisisit* Surplusit-1   1.308***    1.146*** 
   (3.49)    (8.50) 
 Crisisit*Change_infit   1.026    5.693*** 
   (.85)    (3.31) 
 Crisisit*GDP_git-1   -3.355    2.878*** 
   (-1.22)    (6.38) 
        
Observations 32 32 32  32 32 32 
Countries 4 4 4  4 4 4 
Notes:  Beta Maximum Likelihood Estimation (BMLE). Weighted Least Squares (WLS). 
 Marginal effects. T-statistics are between parentheses.   
 * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, significant at the 1% level.  
  The explanatory variables used in all specifications are the same as those reported in Table 2. For 
parsimony, only the marginal effects associated with the interactions between the dummies for 






Table A. Elections and first quarter of economic variables 
 
Variables GDP Inf Unemp Gov Net Lend Elections 
Austria 1960q1 1960q1 1993q1 1970 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008 
Belgium 1960q1 1960q1 1970q1 1970 1971, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010 
Denmark 1960q1 1967q1 1982q1 1971 
1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 
2011 
Finland 1960q1 1960q1 1964q1 1970 1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 
France 1960q1 1960q1 1978q1 1978 1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007 
Germany 1960q1 1960q1 1992q1 1970* 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 
Greece 1960q1 1960q1 1998q2 1995 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009 
Ireland 1960q1 1976q1 1982q1 1990 1973, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011 
Italy 1960q1 1960q1 1979q4 1970 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 
Luxemburg 1960q1 1960q1 1982q1 1990 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
Netherlands 1960q1 1960q1 1970q1 1970 1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010 
Portugal 1960q1 1960q1 1983q1 1977 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011 
Spain 1960q1 1960q1 1978q1 1970 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 
Sweden 1960q1 1960q1 1970q1 1970 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 
United Kingdom 1960q1 1960q1 1971q1 1970 1970, 1974, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 




Appendix B. Averages for economic variables by time periods. 











Government net lending -.029 -.029 -.029 -.059 
Inflation  .058 .084 .022 .022 
Changes in inflation -.005 -.008 -.002 .006 
GDP growth .025 .025 .024 -.0001 
  











Government net lending -.054 -.054 -.055 -.107 
Inflation  .091 .134 .031 .023 
Changes in inflation -.015 -.025 -.001 .009 
GDP growth .026 .024 .028 -.004 
 
 
 
